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DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THE
CASE OF DRUGS
Eyal Benvenistit and George W. Downstt
I. Introduction
WTO drug policy is of particular interest to political economists and
international legal theorists interested in the distributive politics of
international institutions because it embodies so many of what are believed
to be the pathologies of globalization. Coercion and brinksmanship by the
most powerful developed states has meant that a shared collective purpose
among participants is almost totally absent. The policies of the drug regime
are widely believed to be redistributive upward to the benefit of only a
handful of developed states, and many aspects of the regime are arguably
economically inefficient as well. There has been a continued prevalence of
extra-institutional bargaining associated with the drug regime since its
formation that has taken place outside the formal WTO process and
unconnected to any process of collective or democratic decision making.
Finally, provisions of the drug regime designed to provide the populations
in poor states with broad access to drugs in an emergency have proved
difficult to implement in a timely fashion.
In the pages that follow, we explore these problems and the prospects
for progress in their solution. Section two provides a brief political history
of the drug regime, an examination of the role that coercion has played in
its origin and operation, and a description of some of its aspects that make it
emblematic of what has become known as the democratic deficit. Section
three begins by examining the difficulties that international law and
international legal institutions face in trying to limit the role of coercion in
the formation of multilateral institutions such as the WTO. It then goes on
to address the prospects for ex post reform of the WTO's institutions
through democratic reform and via litigation before the Panels and the
Appellate Body. We argue that tribunals are institutionally inclined to level
the playing field among states, but because their power and prestige
depends on the extent to which their decisions are followed by powerful
states, this entrepreneurial bent is inevitably held in check to some degree.
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Section four characterizes the evolution of bargaining power among
both developed and developing states and the extent to which it appears to
be leading to distributive gains. We argue that while the bargaining power
of the U.S. has modestly declined, and that of the large middle income
states such as China, India, and Brazil has increased, the results of this
redistribution, while significant, have been relatively modest. We argue
that this has been due in part to the relatively low priority that most states-
even the most advanced developing states-place on reforming the drug
regime relative to other goals such as agricultural reform and developing
northern markets for their manufacturer's products.
Section five discusses the strategies that the U.S. and EU are using to
reduce the present and future rate of developing state progress in achieving
distributive reforms. These strategies include agreeing to bargain on price
during emergencies as a way to isolate developing state victories and
preserve the institutional integrity of the drug regime. Other similar
strategies are also discussed such as direct investment and the use of
bilateral linkages to other areas such as trade. This section ends with a
characterization of the difficulties of maintaining heterogeneous linkages in
the face of these strategies.
II. The International Politics of Pharmaceutical Products
A. The Coercive Roots of the Intellectual Property Regime
The unilateral roots of the intellectual property components of the
WTO are too well known to warrant an elaborate review here. Frustrated
by a world trade regime that it believed was increasingly unresponsive to
U.S. interests, and worried about political implications of ever mounting
trade imbalances with Japan, Congress set out to reform that regime by
demanding that other states reduce barriers to U.S. investment and exports
and develop rules to protect intellectual property. The principal tools that it
employed to accomplish this were the retaliation threats embodied in
section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, along with subsequent additions
to 301 and the special variants provisions of U.S. trade law. Collectively,
these permitted, and even attempted to impel, the executive branch to
retaliate unilaterally in response to what were thought to be unfair trade
practices.
The most visible affect of the application of these tools was that
between 1985 and 1992 the United States Trade Representative initiated
over ninety specific 301 cases on the basis of complaints by U.S.
corporations and trade groups. While the success of the individual cases
varied a great deal, the general strategy of unilateralism is credited by a
number of analysts with bringing about a number of the reforms
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subsequently embodied in the World Trade Organization and even to
getting multilateralism "back on track."'
Other voices were far more critical. They argued that the United
States had shifted unaccountably from being the world's strongest voice for
the use of multinational negotiations, as the principal vehicle for trade
liberalization, to being their most strident critic. Its threat to withdraw from
the GATT and negotiate bilaterally with prospective trading partners unless
the rest of the world capitulated to its demands appeared to many to be
nothing short of bullying by a great power, and it violated the two most
fundamental principals of GATT, nondiscrimination and MFN, because the
typically 100 percent tariff threat that the U.S. used was employed
selectively against some states but not others.2 However, for critics such as
Bhagwati, the best evidence that the actions of the U.S. were coercive, and
nothing more than a self-intended purpose to capitalize on the bargaining
power that it possessed by virtue of its large markets, was that the U.S.
demands promised no reciprocal benefit in return for the concessions it
demanded and that it did little to insure that the concessions it exacted were
available to other states.3
The U.S. countered that the section 301 cases and the aggressive
transformation of its trade law represented a complement rather than a
substitute to its traditional multilateral approach. A flagrant disregard of
GATT principals by other states was forcing the U.S. to employ its power
unilaterally to save the world trade system and multilateralism before it
destroyed itself. Carla Hills, the U.S. trade representative, stated that the
4U.S. was forced to use "a crowbar" to pry open foreign markets. For our
purposes, the motivations that lie behind the United States' use of section
301-related threats are less important than the fact that the strategy was both
undeniably coercive and corrosive to the principals of due process and
collective decision making.
B. TRIPS, Economic Efficiency, and Distributional Effects
The proponents of tighter intellectual property rights (IPR's) at the
international level frequently argue that they benefit both developing and
developed states by increasing the incentive for research which leads, in
turn, to a higher rate of product innovation and a higher level of collective
welfare than would exist otherwise. The need for such a tightening, as well
as the benefits it offers to developing states, is suggested by the lack of
1 THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTr, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S.
TRADE POLICY 3 (1994).
2 JAGDESH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 54 (1991).
' Id. at 52-53.
4 Id. at 49.
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research into diseases such as malaria and drug-resistant tuberculosis that
primarily affect the developing world where intellectual property rights are
the weakest.
5
This argument is simple enough on the surface, but underneath a host
of complexities exist that are extremely difficult to unravel. For example,
while it is difficult to take issue with the argument that developing states
would benefit by an increased focus on diseases that affect them, it is not
obvious that the value of this benefit is greater than the savings that weaker
intellectual property rights allow them to enjoy on the cost of existing
drugs.
Moreover, even if one grants the argument that intellectual property
rights need to be tightened in the developing world, there remains the
question of just how tight they should be. Sykes argues that the fact that a
twenty year patent protection standard is often found in developed states
makes it a sensible standard to employ in the WTO.6 Yet, there is reason to
be skeptical of this justification. Observers of democratic politics have long
contended that states typically engage in the over-protection of important
domestic industries. This observation is consistent with Olson's classic
argument that small groups are better able to organize to pursue their
interests than a diffuse and disorganized public because the transaction
costs of doing so are smaller and they are less plagued by free rider
problems.7 And it is also consistent with the more recent political
economists' research on the implications of current campaign finance laws
which allows wealthy corporations and individuals the opportunity to
purchase influence. 8 These political economists would see no reason why
they should be less skeptical of the welfare implications of twenty year
patent protection than of other interest group-oriented policies that no one
would begin to defend as collectively efficient, such as steel tariffs, cotton
subsidies, and sugar subsidies.
There is also reason to believe that the argument is more complicated
than defenders of increased intellectual property rights suggest, and that
innovation rates represent only one part of the story. Helpman, who has
produced one of the more sophisticated general treatments of the subject,
argues that it is important to examine how at least four different dimensions
of the problem affect the welfare of developed and developing states. 9
5 Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries and the Doha
"Solution, " 3 ClI. J. INT'L L. 47, 49 (2002).
6 1d. at 58
7 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 22-36 (1965).
8 See GENE M. GROSSMAN AND ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 225-32
(2001).
9 See Elhanan Helpman, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights. 61
ECONOMETRICA 1247, 1249 (1993).
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These dimensions include (a) the terms of trade; (b) the interregional
location of manufacturing; (c) product availability; and (d) R&D
investment patterns.
In terms of trade and the location of manufacturing, Helpman argues
that tighter IPR's shift production from less developed to more developed
states, leading to higher profits for developed state drug firms. This
improves welfare in the north and decreases it in the south. However, the
fact that drugs are then manufactured in developed states, where the wages
are highest, increases the cost of drugs which tends to reduce the welfare of
both regions. This suggests that in terms of these two dimensions of the
problem, tighter IPR's always operate to reduce the welfare of developing
states, and they may or may not be to the advantage of the developed states
that favor them. The answer for developed states depends on the degree to
which the welfare benefits of the increased level of drug firm
manufacturing is offset by the impact of the increases in the higher costs
that developed state consumers have to pay.
Helpman presents an analysis which shows that when the rate of
imitation is relatively low (i.e., when the rate of illegal copying is modest)
tight IPR's operate to the disadvantage of developed states and developing
states alike because the higher profits achieved by developed state drug
firms are more than offset by the higher costs of drugs. This is not likely to
stop drug firms in the north from pushing for tighter intellectual property
standards (a fact to which we will later return); but a welfare-minded
democratic government would have good reason not to respond to this
pressure. Only when the rate of imitation is high should drug firms and
voters both be on the side of tighter intellectual property rules.
Helpman argues that the innovation rate and the number of products
available to consumers-the benefits that the drug lobby traditionally
equates with stricter intellectual property standards-is also complicated.
He shows that while a tightening of IPR's initially leads to an increase in
the innovation rate, this rate subsequently declines to a level that is less than
it would have been had the tightening not taken place. This is because the
drug company has less of an incentive to find more effective substitutes for
its existing products. The same process leads to the availability of fewer
drugs in the long run.
In short, while it appears that northern consumers sometimes benefit,
and northern drug firms always benefit 'from the tightening of intellectual
property standards in the pharmaceutical area, the south never benefits. All
the south gets are higher prices, fewer manufacturing jobs, and fewer drugs
to choose from in the long run.10
10 But See Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 35-38 (2202) (arguing
changing attitudes among global players have contributed to stronger intellectual property
protections in developing countries).
2004]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The actual details of the pharmaceutical provisions that are embedded
in the GATT/WTO have another provocative feature apart from their
redistribution upward: they display little evidence of compromise apart
from an adjustment period for generic drug firms in developing states. As
we have seen, the length of patent protection was set at twenty years-the
exact duration that had been proposed by U.S. drug firms-and a period
that appears designed to extract the most revenue from the poorest states
and destroy the emerging drug industry in states such as India and Brazil. It
is true that the harshness of this effect is mitigated by a substantial
adjustment period for these states, but this seems more designed to insulate
southern politicians from negative political fallout of signing on to the
agreement than to protect the long term interests of southern consumers.
C. The Politics of AIDS Drugs
For many, the tension between the drug provisions contained in the
TRIPS agreement and the twin demands of the south for access to life
preserving drugs and a voice in determining the rules by which the world
trade regime is organized is best exemplified by the controversy over the
availability of AIDS drugs in poor countries. At least on paper, it is a
conflict that perhaps need not have happened. While the twenty years of
patent protection contained in the original TRIPS agreement was obviously
destined from the start to raise the drug prices in the south and restrict
access, it did contain a number of provisions that were designed to help
developing states deal with a public health crisis such as AIDS. The two
most prominent of these mechanisms were compulsory licensing and
parallel importing.
Compulsory licensing permits the production of a drug without the
owners consent when such production is warranted by public interest. The
holder of the license can be a different drug firm or the government itself.
Licenses can be granted for noncommercial use of the drug, to produce
drugs during an emergency at very low prices, and to prevent anti-
competitive practices. In the event that a drug is sold, a reasonable royalty
is to be paid to the patent holder.' 1
Parallel imports involve importing drugs from another state where they
are available more cheaply, and then reselling them without the consent of
the original producer. Since the prices of drugs vary dramatically from one
state to another and many, if not most, developing states lack the capacity
to produce their own drugs under compulsory licensing, parallel imports
can potentially provide a powerful tool for lowing prices and increasing
access. We say potentially because the precise conditions under which one
1 C.P. Chandrasekhar & Jayati Ghosh, WTO drugs deal: Does it really benefit developing
countries?, The Hindu Business Line, available at http://www .thehindubusinessline.com/
2003/09/09/stories/2003090900140900.htm (Sept. 09, 2003).
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state is justified in permitting the export of drugs which are still under
patent protection is not defined in WTO. As Sykes points out, Article 6 of
TRIPS explicitly holds that nothing in the agreement addresses the issue
regarding the extent to which the patent holder maintains any control over
the resale rights of a product once it has been sold.
12
Despite the theoretical availability of these options, developing states
have been reluctant to use these tools for fear that it would lead to
retaliation by the United States and Europe, both of which possess
enormous bargaining leverage by virtue of the fact that they are the chief
importers of developing state goods. "This is why developing countries
were keen on explicit recognition in the WTO that public health
requirements could permit the legal implementation of loopholes that
already existed in the TRIPS document. All the subsequent activity has
been devoted to nothing more ambitious than a restatement of that basic
right."'
13
As a result of the technical complexities and political problems,
developing states became increasingly frustrated that their public health
needs did not enjoy a status comparable to that accorded them in other areas
of the GATT. Thus, while the GATT Article XX stated that "[n]othing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
of by any contracting party of measures necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health," the TRIPS agreement added a significant
restriction. It allowed members to adopt measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition only "provided that such provisions are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement."
1 5
The Doha declaration on TRIPS and public health represented some
progress toward the restatement of rights desired by developing states. It
acknowledged the right of each state to grant compulsory licenses in an
emergency and to determine what represented an emergency. What it did
not do was grant states the same power of self-determination in connection
with establishing the grounds for parallel importing. This is significant
because the compulsory licensing provision is meaningless for those states
in the south that do not contain drug firms capable of manufacturing generic
products. Their only hope for access to sophisticated AIDS drugs lies in
working out purchasing arrangements with generic drug firms in states such
as India and Brazil. Instead of providing a simplified process for doing
this, the final version cleared in August 2003 actually constituted a
significant retreat from a draft statement that had been previously
12 Sykes, supra note 5, at 53 (discussing patent protection exhaustion, Sykes also raises
the prospect that parallel importing may lead drug manufacturers to raise the price of drugs
for those states which re-export them in order to reduce the problem).
13 Chandrasekhar & Ghosh, supra note 11.
141d.
151d.
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negotiated in 2001, but was subsequently held up by the U.S. government
on behalf of the drug lobby for fear that it would allow generic firms in
states such as India and Brazil to flood the market with cheap copies. In the
eyes of some observers, the result is an agreement that "is patently
imbalanced in favor of large multinational patent holders [and] so
restrictive and so unworkable for exporters and importers of generic
drUgs."'
16
"The suspicion must be that this agreement, which had been held up
for so long by the developed countries (especially the U.S.) and the
multinational drug lobby, has now been hammered down the throats of the
unfortunate developing country negotiators, simply in order to show some
results before the Cancun meeting. If this is so, it augurs badly for the
outcome of other trade negotiations in Cancun. ' ' 7
Fortunately, the situation was more complicated and less bleak from
the standpoint of at least some developing states than the diplomatic history
of Doha seems to suggest. During the same period that negotiators were
wrangling over language in the WTO, Latin American states were
conducting their negotiations with U.S. and European drug firms regarding
access to low cost AIDS drugs. While Brazil engaged in its own
negotiations with the drug firms, ten other states including Argentina,
Mexico, and Chile rejected the prices offered by developed state
multinationals and entered into an agreement with a group of generic
manufacturers from middle income developing states and Abbott labs, at a
price less than half of the cost negotiated in 2002 by a group of Caribbean
states with the major multinational firms. At around the same time, the
multinationals offered roughly comparable or lower prices to a number of
African countries.
D. Bargaining on Price and Extra-institutional Policymaking
The Glivec case has received far less attention than the AIDS case in
the news media, but it is important both for what it reveals about the
interstate bargaining that typically surrounds the marketing of a new high
profile drug, and because it illustrates the emerging battle over access to
drugs that is taking place between drug producing states and those middle
income states that possess a substantial middle class, such as South Korea
and Brazil.
Glivec is a drug that is used in treating various leukemia and other
types of solid tumors and possesses the twin virtues of greater effectiveness
and fewer side effects than other alternatives. Its chief limitation is cost.
Glivec costs about $27,000 a year per patient in the United States, a price
16 id
17 1d
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that makes it both extremely profitable and inaccessible for the vast
majority of the world's population.18
Cookson and Dyer argue that, faced with declining profitability in the
European market in recent years, drug firms of potentially high profit drugs
such as Glivec are increasingly turning to growing middle income markets
in Asia and Latin America to make up the difference. They quote an
Oxfam official who remarks that it is this market, rather than the market for
AIDS drugs in the poorest countries, that the drug companies really care
about. 19 To win this battle, Glivec's developer and the developer of similar
drugs need to fight off possible competition from the generic manufacturers
that currently exist in these countries already or which could be created
overnight. It is only natural that the northern drug firms turn to their
governments for help in this battle, and it is only politically expedient for
the states to respond.
One high profile dispute occurred in South Korea, where South Korea
wanted to be able to provide the drug for a lower price than the drug
company charged in the U.S. The drug company refused and the U.S.
government stepped in to pressure South Korea to pay a price equal to the
average price among the Group of Seven countries, and to agree to reject an
application for a compulsory license to be issued for the drug which would
have opened the way for generic production. Interestingly, the U.S. appears
to have taken this step not so much to maximize the profits for Glivec's
manufacturer-a Swiss firm-but to prevent a precedent that might
eventually damage the profitability of products manufactured by its own
firms.
Cookson and Dyer say that this dispute over Glivec is typical of the
"strong-arm" tactics that the U.S. government uses to defend its drug
industry. "The U.S. government does not control the price of drugs in its
own country but it is telling Korea what they should charge," says Jamie
Love of the Consumer Project on Technology.
Yet interestingly, the outcomes and the strategies that are employed
are not always the same. The Brazilian government threatened to issue a
compulsory permit that would have permitted the generic manufacture of
Glivec unless it got a substantial price reduction from the G-7 price that
South Korea had agreed to pay. Brazil won. Its citizens now pay $13
dollars per dose compared to the $19 dollars per dose charged South
Koreans. According to Cookson and Dyer, Natco, an Indian generics firm
that has already launched a generic version of Glivec, expects to be able to
reduce the price even lower.
18 Clive Cookson and Geoff Dyer, A Drugs Deal for the World's Poorest: now the fight is
over patents and cheap medicines in middle income countries, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003 at
19.
19 Id.
20 id.
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Whatever the human significance of these outcomes in these three
cases, it is noteworthy from a political point of view that they are the
product of bilateral bargaining between a middle income state and either the
drug firm that holds the patent, or the U.S. government. They appear to
have been little influenced by any multilateral decision or dispute resolution
process despite the fact they fall within the province of the WTO.
I1. Challenges for International Law and the WTO
In general, the above analysis suggests that despite the high hopes that
the WTO would help curb the coercive effects of economic concentration in
the hands of a few northern states, there has been little progress in
connection with pharmaceutical products. In this section, we first examine
the relevant international law norms that affect states' ability to resort to
coercion. We then explore to what extent these norms are, or can be,
modified by the contemporary regime of trade law and by the WTO treaty
bodies.
A. The Legal Background
To date, international law has made little explicit attempt to constrain
powerful states from using economic coercion to elicit concessions from
weaker states. In fact, it provides two basic ground rules that facilitate such
behavior. The first is the principle that states have freedom of action unless
it is limited by international law. This principle may be called the Lotus
principle (because it was pronounced in the famous Lotus case).2 1 This is
equivalent to saying that unless states can overcome the collective action
problems involved in prescribing and then enforcing regulation of the
market, the default rules of the international trade regime are the rules of
the free and unregulated market. Thus, until southern states agreed to the
strict TRIPS obligations, they did not violate any international law by
producing generic drugs. Similarly, until the northern states agree to
impose upon themselves restrictions on price-fixing and other cartelistic
behavior, they may continue to engage in anti-competitive measures.22
The second principle is the non-intervention in the internal affairs of
states, which actually does not prohibit external economic pressures.
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter reiterates this principle: "nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
21 The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10 (1927), at 18, 19.
22 See Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 911
(2003); Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from
Intellectual Property 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 933 (2003) (discussing the need to regulate
international anti-competive activities).
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matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
Although on the surface this principle declares the relative immunity of
states to outside intervention, it fails to specify what types of interventions
are proscribed. As a result, the nature of what constitutes "intervention"
remains contested. Stronger states claim that external economic pressure
does not constitute "intervention" as long as the institutions of the state in
question are the ones that formally decide. The fact that there may have
been undue duress involved is immaterial. Southern states, not
surprisingly, tend to see this debate differently.23 Among many of them the
concern about economic interference is quite strong. For example, Article
15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which
proscribes outside intervention in the internal affairs of a state, emphasizes
that this principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic, and cultural elements. 24
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) appears to have combined the
first principle with the interpretation of the second, preferred by powerful
states, to reject the claim that economic coercion constitutes intervention in
internal affairs. In a suit brought by Nicaragua against the United States
before the ICJ, Nicaragua asserted that the United States had violated the
principle of nonintervention by cutting off economic aid, by reducing
Nicaragua's sugar quota by 90 percent, and by imposing a comprehensive
trade embargo. While the ICJ also ruled that the United States had violated
customary international law by training and arming the anti-government
contras, the majority was unable to find a breach of the law by imposing
economic sanctions. As the court explained: "[T]he Court has merely to
say that it is unable to regard such action on the economic plane as is here
complained of as a breach of the customary-law principle of non-
intervention. 25
If general international law does not proscribe economic pressure to
elicit compliance, could then the law of treaties contain strategic behavior
by nullifying agreements concluded through coercion? The debate in this
context is about the availability of a doctrine on economic coercion in the
23 James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance:
Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1996,
2033 (2003) (book review).
24 Diana E. Moller, Intervention, Coercion, Or Justifiable Need? A Legal Analysis Of
Structural Adjustment Lending In Costa Rica, 2 SW. J. OF L. & TRADE AM.483, 518 (1995)
(arguing that economic coercion renders treaties void and is a breach of the norm of non-
intervention in the inter American context) ( quoting Charter of the Organization of
American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.I. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol of
Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 789 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 15) (emphasis same as
original).
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, at 126 (June 27).
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law on treaties. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties defines coercion as "the threat or use of force in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations. ''26 This concept of coercion that was adopted after a long debate
constituted a novelty in international law: Article 52 signified a break from
the old law that recognized the validity of treaties even though they resulted
from gunship diplomacy and actual subjugation through force. Not
surprisingly, the developed countries objected to the introduction of the
concept of coercion to international treaty law,27 but had to agree that what
was illegal under the UN Charter, i.e. aggressive use of force, could not
give rise to valid treaty obligations.
The text of Article 52 could therefore be seen as a compromise. The
rich countries' concession put off any formal acknowledgement on their
part that economic coercion amounted to "threat or use of force in violation
of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations." Yet, the door was left open for the south to try to link economic
coercion to the prohibition under the UN Charter to use force. Again, the
rather apprehensive Latin American states tried to develop a theory
according to which the "force" prohibited under the UN Charter included
also economic force. Already in 1945, in the San Francisco Conference,
Brazil introduced an amendment to Article 2(4) of the Charter which, if
adopted, would have prohibited not only the "threat or use of force" but
also the threat or use of economic coercion.28 Since then, "the narrow
interpretation of the concept of 'force' has generally prevailed among
Western states, while the Communist bloc and most of the Third World
countries have favored a broader construction of Article 2(4) embodying
also economic coercion.,
29
We should note that the compromise was presented in rather technical
terms. In its 1963 report, the International Law Commission's Rapporteur,
Sir Humphrey Waldock, explained the difficulties with the introduction of
economic coercion:
"[I]f 'coercion' were to be regarded as extending to other forms of
pressure upon a State, to political or economic pressure, the door to
the evasion of treaty obligations might be opened very wide; for
26 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 52, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.39/27.
27 "The United States figured prominently among the delegations opposed to allowing a
claim of economic coercion to invalidate a treaty." See Jon Hinck, The Republic of Palau
and the United States: Self-Determination Becomes the Price of Free Association 78 CALIF.
L. REv. 915, 962-967 (1990).
28 Text of the Brazilian amendment (Doc. 215, I/1/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 558-559
(1945)) discussed in, Domingo E. Acevedo, The U.S. Measures Against Argentina Resulting
From The Malvinas Conflict 78 AM. J. INT'LL. 323, 327 n.13 (1984).
29 1d. at 327-28 n.13
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these forms of 'coercion' are much less capable of definition and
much more liable to subjective appreciations. Moreover, the
operation of political and economic pressures is part of the normal
working of the relations between States, and international law does
not yet seem to contain the criteria necessary for formulating
distinctions between the legitimate and illegitimate uses of such
forms of pressure as a means of securing consent to treaties."
30
Waldock's position made a great deal of sense at the time. It is no easy
matter to come up with a robust definition of what constitutes the
distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate use of economic force
that is not liable to a wide range of subjective appreciations. Today,
however, the concern with subjective appreciations may be addressed
institutionally via recourse to dispute resolution under the WTO dispute
resolution proceedings-a topic with which we will deal in the next section.
Whether such rulings will exhibit much independence from the preferences
of powerful states and whether they will be accepted and complied with by
powerful states if they do are, of course, other questions which Waldcock
deftly side-stepped with the cryptic note that political and economic
pressure "is part of the normal working relations between States." We will
return to the latter questions later in the paper. First, however, we want to
look at the case for hoping that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
("DSP") might be able to blunt some the problems described earlier.
B. The WTO as the Potential Venue for the Evolution of the Law
The relatively elaborate norms of the GATT, and the quite effective
dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO focus the attention of states and
scholars on the possibility that trade law, as interpreted and applied by the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, will transform the regime of economic
relations between states from essentially a laissez-faire system to a more
regulated one: a system which links trade rules to other obligations states
have, such as the obligations to protect human rights and the environment.
This is a question of substance, which faces an initial legal difficulty,
namely to what extent can the GATT law be viewed as a self-contained
regime that is immune to the influence of other areas of international law,
including human rights law, labor law, and environmental law. In addition
to this question of substance, there is also a question concerning process: to
what extent should the decision-making processes within the WTO (both in
the DSB and the multinational renegotiation rounds) be more democratic,
allowing for smaller, less economically powerful states and non-
governmental voices to represent the wider spectrum of global interests.
This section outlines the debate (subsections 1 and 2) and assesses (in
30 Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Second report on the Law of Treaties, Doc.
A/CN.4/156 1963, rep. in II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1963, 36, at 52.
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subsection 3) the responses offered so far by the Appellate Body (AB) of
the WTO.
1. Substance: Trade Law and Its Potential Links to other Areas of
Law
Several issues have been raised in the context of the possible
regulation of international trade. These include the interface between trade
and human rights, between trade and international environmental law, as
well as the proscription of economic coercion or anti-competitive measures
in international relations. These issues share two fundamental questions.
The first and more general question is whether international trade law
should or should not provide only for a laissez-faire regime and remain
indifferent to the domination by the more powerful even at the cost of
inefficiency or unfairness. The second more specific question is whether
the existing law of the GATT can be interpreted as supporting one or the
other interpretation.
The second question has preoccupied many legal scholars resulting in
the emergence of two camps arguing for or against the view that the GATT
law is a so-called self-contained regime. Beyond the assessment of the
different interpretations, however, it is interesting to explore the views
expressed by state parties before WTO treaty bodies, and the decisions
taken within this institution. Curiously, both camps - the north and the
south - respond in two voices to the general question. Both the developed
northern states and the developing south seek to impose constraints on
international markets. Both the north and the south stand for opposing such
constraints. Of course, each camp advocates the imposition of norms in
exactly those areas where the other camp resists them. These
inconsistencies suggest that neither side truly purports to attain collective
goals. Yet, at the same time they suggest that an all-inclusive compromise
may not be completely out of the question.
The north champions the human rights and labor rights of the workers
within the southern states. It also maintains that the southern states'
compliance with their obligations under international environmental treaties
is part and parcel of their free trade obligations. In both spheres the
northern claim is that unacceptably low standards of human and labor rights
and environmental protection are themselves unfair trade practices.
Southern governments demur, of course, against what they see as
intervention in domestic affairs prompted by northern concern about
competition. They regard what the north refers to as their lower standards
as their relative advantage, often the only advantage they have. At the same
time the south puts forward different claims for the regulation of
international transactions. It argues that the protection of IP under TRIPS is
excessive and threatens the basic interests of their citizens; that the
opportunities for suppliers of northern products to abuse their monopolistic
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positions must be checked, and that economic coercion must be recognized
as illegal, thereby voiding agreements concluded through the use of such
coercion.
At the same time, in some areas both the north and the south call for
the non-regulation of international transactions. The north, who would like
the developing south to be more conscious of domestic human and labor
rights, refuses to control monopolistic behavior when it is directed only
against foreign markets, and rejects the notion of economic coercion as too
vague and dangerous. Some of the southern states, those who have natural
resources they export-particularly the oil producing states-reject
international limitations on their sovereign rights to dispose of their natural
resources, even by way of cartelization and embargos.3'
For the purposes of this essay, one striking aspect of the debate is that
the human rights discourse that is espoused by the north in the context of
labor rights is dismissed by the north as irrelevant to the claim of the
developing countries that AIDS victims and others have a right to receive
life-saving treatment at manageable cost. Why should a southern state be
obliged-under international human rights law-to provide its citizens with
decent working conditions, but not have the right and duty, based on the
same law, to provide them with decent medical treatment when they
become ill?
The explanation favored by northern states lies in a neat distinction
that runs through international human rights law. Human rights law applies
traditionally to the relationship between a state and the individuals subject
to its "effective control." This "effective control" test has so far been
interpreted as applying only in areas subject to the direct control of the state
organs. Therefore, under this doctrine, a state is not responsible for the
protection of human rights of foreign citizens situated outside its
jurisdiction. Under certain circumstances, the state may come to the
support of foreign nationals-by, for example, imposing sanctions on the
foreign government, or by the so-called humanitarian intervention. But
there is no obligation to do so. So, while the north may impose sanctions
on southern states that do not respect the southern citizens' rights, the north
has no obligation to care for those citizens when they are too poor to obtain
life saving medicines.
"' Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Arab Policies and the New International Economic Order, 16 VA.
J. INT'L L. 261, 267-68, (1976): "The embargo [on oil supplies in 19733 and accompanying
production cutbacks were in full conformity with customary international law ... Arab oil-
exporting States were ... only exercising their recognized sovereign right to dispose of their
natural resources in the manner which best suited their legitimate interests."
2004]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
2. Process: The Democratization of the WTO
As noted earlier, "democratization" in the context of the WTO and
other international institutions typically refers to participatory rights in the
decision-making process, such as the right to receive and impart
information, rather than the right of individuals to elect representatives.
The strong connection between democracy and the transparent and
accessible decision-making process within the international institution was
emphasized by the German Constitutional Court, when it explained why
Germany's ratification of the Maastricht Treaty did not signify the
abdication of the Germans' right to democracy.32 In an integrated European
Union, reasoned the Court, the demand for democracy will be satisfied if
the union will provide an "ongoing free interaction of social forces,
interests, and ideas, in the course of which political objectives are also
clarified and modified, and as a result of which public opinion moulds
political policy. '33 Since the creation of the WTO, there has been growing
NGO demand for more transparency in decision-making. The norm-setting
process within the WTO involves all member states. This is mainly an
informal, behind-the-scenes process of negotiations and consultations. The
official website of the WTO suggests that such "informal consultations
within the WTO play a vital role in bringing a vastly diverse membership
round to an agreement." 34  This informal prescriptive process remains
opaque to civil society. Indeed, NGOs representing diverse interests can
sometimes use this opacity to present their views and gather information,35
but this influence remains a matter of discretion for states who find it
opportune to support some NGOs on a certain matter under discussion.
The plenary sessions of the Ministerial Conferences were open to
observers since the first Conference held in Singapore in 1996.36 In July
1996, the General Council adopted Guidelines for Arrangements on
Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations.37 The guidelines recall
32 Federal Constitutional Court Decision concerning the Maastricht Treaty, 33 I.L.M. 388,
420 (1994)).
33 id.
34 See "Understanding the WTO: Whose WTO is it anyway?," at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/ whatise/tif e/orgl e.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
35 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 433 (1998). For a recent appraisal of the debate, see Eric Stein, International
Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J.INT'L L. 489, 504-09 (2001).
36 The number of NGOs attending the plenary sessions has grown from 108 at the
Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996 to 686 at the Seattle Ministerial Conference in
1999. See Communication from Hong Kong, China, WTO: External Transparency,
WT/GC/W/418 (Oct 31, 2000).
37 Guidelines for Arrangements on relations with Non-Governmental Organizations,
WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996) [hereinafter WT/L/162].
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Article V:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, which
provided that "the General Council may make appropriate arrangements for
consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO. 38 In these guidelines,
the Council members "recognize the role NGOs can play to increase the
awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities." '3  They further
acknowledge that NGOs are "a valuable resource [that] can contribute to
the accuracy and richness of the public debate. 40 The Members therefore
agree to improve transparency and develop communication with NGOs.
' 4
For this purpose, the guidelines call upon members to "ensure more
information about WTO activities in particular by making available
documents which would be derestricted more promptly than in the past."42
The WTO Secretariat is requested to provide on-line computer access to
such documents. The Secretariat is instructed further to "play a more active
role in its direct contacts with NGOs . . . through various means such as
inter alia the organization on an ad hoc basis of symposia on specific
WTO-related issues, informal arrangements to receive the information
NGOs may wish to make available for consultation by interested
delegations and the continuation of past practice of responding to requests
for general information and briefings about the WTO. ' 4
At the same time, however, the guidelines reflect the concern many
governments have with more formalized decision-making procedures that
may increase transparency and voice to other governments and to NGOs.
Article 6 emphasizes "the special character of the WTO, which is both a
legally binding intergovernmental treaty of rights and obligations among its
Members and a forum for negotiations," and points out the "broadly held
view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the
work of the WTO or its meetings."" The intergovernmental character of
the WTO implies, according to the guidelines, that the appropriate level for
NGOs' direct participation is the national level: "Closer consultation and
cooperation with NGOs can also be met constructively through appropriate
processes at the national level where lies primary responsibility for taking
into account the different elements of public interest which are brought to
bear on trade policy-making. '
38 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994), art. V(2).
39 WT/L/162 supra note 37.
40 Id. at art. IV.
41 Id. at art. II.
42 Id. at art. III.
41 Id. at art. IV.
44 Id. at art. VI.
45 Id.
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In the years since 1996 impressive efforts have been made, particularly
by the Secretariat, to provide accessible information including documents to
the general public by posting it on the WTO website. A few northern
members have come up with suggestions for improved transparency.
Canada, Norway, and the United States suggested inter alia that General
Council and other committee meetings be open to observers, including
Trade Policy Review meetings, where members' policies are reviewed for
conformity with WTO rules.4 6  Other suggestions included the
establishment of fora to enable open dialogue between WTO bodies and
NGOs, the inclusion of advice of legislators from member states and of
experts in specialized areas, and the creation of ad-hoc advisory boards to
provide non-binding NGO advice on a variety of issues.47 Such northern
suggestions are not well-received by the developing southern countries that
stand to lose from a more active role for NGOs that represent the interests
of the relatively well-off societies seeking to maintain high levels of
welfare and environmental protection. As a result, developing members
often work to restrict public participation to the passive role of receiving
information from WTO bodies rather than communicating it to the WTO.48
The main area of attention in this respect has so far been the
procedures within the judicial organs themselves. In contrast to most other
intemational adjudication procedures, the WTO procedures maintain
46 See General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency, Submission
from the United States, WT/GC/W/413 (Oct. 13, 2000) [hereinafter U.S. Submission]; WTO
External Transparency, Informal Paper by Canada, WT/GC/W/415 (Oct. 16, 2000)
[hereinafter Canada Paper]; External Transparency, Communication from Norway,
WT/GC/W/419 (Nov. 2, 2000).
47 See Canada Paper, supra note 46.
48 Note the position of Hong-Kong, China on this matter, elaborating on the distinction
between external transparency and direct participation:
"8. In our view, enhancing "external transparency" of the WTO means keeping
the public informed and educated of the WTO's work, enriching their
understanding and awareness of the Organization and the multilateral trading
system, and thereby improving the ability of the public to reflect views to their
governments. On the other hand, "participation" in the WTO by non-Members
implies a right to take part in the decision-making process of WTO, a right to
make representations of interest in the formal WTO setting and in the process
prejudice the outcome of discussions. 9. While we are prepared to consider those
proposals aiming at improving transparency, we are not convinced of the
desirability of adopting proposals which seek to make provisions for direct
participation of the civil society in the Organization in this exercise. Such
proposals go against the inter-governmental nature of the WTO, risk politicising
the operations of the Organization due to sectoral and electoral interests, and
undermine the rights and obligations of individual WTO Members." See
Communication from Hong Kong, China, supra note 36.
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secrecy. Litigation before the Panels and the Appellate Body are closed to
WTO members who are not parties to the litigation and to the general
public. Calls for transparency focus therefore on making all parties'
submissions available to the public and on enabling the general public to
observe the proceedings using various tools, including web casting.49
Moreover, suggestions for enabling the flow of communication from the
public to the adjudicators concentrate on the possibility of submitting
amicus briefs to the panel and the appellate bodies.
Northern members tend to strongly support open and accessible
proceedings. The United States is the most ardent supporter of
transparency and communication in the dispute settlement process. 50 It,
apparently, believes it has the most to gain from such openness. In fact, it
was the first and so far the only state that presented NGO briefs as an
integral part of its brief while defending its environment-friendly unilateral
restrictions on trade against the complaint of India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
Thailand.5
In general, however, we believe that the promise of opening up WTO
decision processes and linking trade to other normative constraints is
limited. Greater transparency and NGO participation can lead to greater
public awareness of policies, but as the AIDS drugs case suggests, there are
significant limitations on the role that international public opinion actually
plays. The pharmaceutical companies are doubtless well aware of this and
so do not insist on limiting public access to the process.
3. Responses by the WTO Dispute Resolution Bodies
The DSP is active both in creating linkages and in opening up the
decision making process to nongovernmental voices. The Appellate Body
(AB) accepted a link between trade and the protection of the environment in
the Shrimp-Turtle case.52 The question is open with respect to the AB's
attitude towards a possible link between trade and human rights. 53 The AB
has also opened up its dispute settlement process to third states and NGOs.
It has shown a clear inclination to consider amicus briefs of third states and
49 See U.S. submission, supra note 46.
50 id,
51 The complaint criticized the U.S. prohibition on the importation of certain shrimp and
shrimp products caught in methods considered by the U.S. to adversely affect the population
of sea turtles. WTO Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Report].
52 id.
53 Werner Meng, International Labor Standards and International Trade Law, in THE
WELFARE STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 371, 387 (Eyal Benvenisti &
Georg Nolte Eds., 2004).
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NGOs thereby rendering the process more transparent and accessible. 4 In
a decision that enraged numerous southern states, the AB invited third
parties to submit briefs and then denied their requests to do so without
explanation in the face of furious reactions to its decision.5  Interestingly,
however, despite the strong political reaction to its invitation, the AB did
not retract its principled approach, but rather left open the door for future
requests for third party intervention, and actually enabled them in a
subsequent case.56 The AB also recognized the "due process" rights of
foreigners vis-A-vis a state that imposes constraints on trade that affect
them. These foreigners have a right of hearing during national legislation
proceedings for potentially affected foreign interest groups to grant.7
What can we learn from these initial decisions of the AB? As other
tribunals before it, such as the European Court of Justice and the
International Court of Justice, the AB has taken the liberty of translating the
silence of the treaty and general international law into authorization to
progressively develop the law. Such bodies reason that the state parties
always have the option of undoing the tribunal's ruling if they wish. Thus,
for example, when the AB opened the door for third parties' briefs, it
defended the action by noting the silence of the lawmakers in connection
with the issue:
"[N]othing in the DSU or the Working Procedures specifically
provides that the Appellate Body may accept and consider
submissions or briefs from sources other than the participants and
third participants in an appeal. On the other hand, neither the DSU
nor the Working Procedures explicitly prohibit[s] acceptance or
consideration of such briefs.... Therefore, we are of the opinion
that as long as we act consistently with the provisions of the DSU
and the covered agreements, we have the legal authority to decide
whether or not to accept and consider any information that we
believe is pertinent and useful in an appeal.", 8
54 For analyses of the Panels' and Appellate Body's authority to consult amicus briefs see
Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade
Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA 35, 48-
51 (Joseph H.H. Weiler, ed., 2000), Petros C. Mavroidis, Amicus Curiae Briefs Before The
WTO: Much Ado About Nothing, Jean Monnet Paper No. 2/01 (2002) available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/ papers/papers 01 .html.
55 WTO Appellate Body, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS 135/9 (March 12, 2001).
56 WTO Appellate Body, European Communities 
- Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R, paras. 153-170 (Sept. 26, 2002).
57 Shrimp Report, supra note 51.
58 WTO Appellate Body, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom,
WT/DS 13 8/AB/R, para. 39 adopted (emphasis added) (May 10, 2000).
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This formal explanation reveals an important aspect of international
lawmaking that is responsible for overcoming discord among states. The
"legislative impasse" among states at the level of treaty-making and
collective bargaining, which prevented the adoption of thicker rules and
more formal decision-making procedure, can at least under some
circumstances effectively relegate authority to the judicial organs to
develop the law in line with what they perceive to be global interests. The
question is, what are those circumstances? There is a general sense in the
legal community that one critical prerequisite for judicial entrepreneurship
is the expectation that the ruling will be accepted. International tribunals
like domestic courts are acutely aware of their own status and reputation.
They have a keen sense of the limits on their enforcement and managerial
powers, and do not want their reputation and prestige to be damaged by
judgments that go ignored by powerful actors.59 This suggests that the
entrepreneurship of courts tends to be greatest when there is relatively little
power disparity among actors and when the affected actors have little
ability to threaten the institution of which the court is a part with exiting or
the withholding of funds.60 This dynamic also suggests that international
tribunals have an institutional interest themselves in trying to level the
playing field between the participating state actors as much as they can.
The more power is balanced, the more the tribunal will enjoy independence
and actual legislative powers. The difficulty is that the ability of courts to
do this is usually rather modest, especially when the power disparities are
relatively large. Hence our expectation is that the ability of judicial
entrepreneurship to level the playing field to increase its own rule making
authority depends firsi and foremost on the evolution of a favorable pattern
of power relations among states. In the meantime, however, there is every
indication that we can count on international decision-makers, in particular
on the WTO judges, to remain acutely aware of these relations and to
continuously test the waters.
IV. Evolution in the Bargaining Power of Developing States
Of course, it is one thing to argue that the entrepreneurial range of the
judiciary is critically dependent on the power disparities among the states,
and quite another to accurately characterize how these disparities are
evolving and why. In recent years, international legal scholars have looked
to international relations theory for such guidance, but many have come to
realize that international relations is as contested a field as any with which
59 This may suggest that to date the evolving jurisprudence of the AB does not conflict
with stronger states' interests as much as is sometimes assumed. That is, that greater
transparency has had relatively little effect on actual policy outcomes except in those few
cases where judges have correctly calculated that even the stronger states have more to lose
by undermining the authority of the tribunal than they do by complying with it.
60 The ICJ litigation in the claim of Nicaragua against the U.S. is one rare example for the
limits of power.
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they themselves are familiar. Each of the dominant theoretical perspectives
is well-armored against falsifiability by an endless assortment of
ambiguities and abstractions that can be operationalised in any number of
ways by those who adhere to each theory. The fact that the major theories
tend to focus on different issues and different variables only
increases the difficulty of making comparative judgments. Rather than
attempt to review the landscape of international relations theory and
evaluate the extent to which each are capable of explaining the historical
developments in WTO drug policy, we think it would be more useful to
examine informally how the distributive politics of drug policy is evolving
through the lens of a hybrid perspective that we consider most appropriate.
Often referred to as political economy, this approach contains
elements of each of the traditional schools of realism, institutionalism,
liberalism, and is no more well-defined or homogeneous than they are, but
its applications tend to possess a number of things in common. First, much
of the analytic apparatus is drawn from economics. Individual actors are
assumed to act purposefully and strategically based on rational expectations
but not necessarily narrowly: the nature of what goes into determining a
given actor's utility function is globally undefined and context specific.
Uncertainty and discount rates are also important and game theory is widely
employed as an analytic tool. Second, relative power plays an important
role in determining differences in the bargaining power and strategic
behavior of actors, and the range of possible outcomes. However, what
constitutes the nature of relative power in a given context is also highly
contextual. Military power does not possess the supremacy that it does in
realism and various forms of economic power, and positional power
derived from the nature of the institutional context are taken quite seriously.
Third, domestic politics play a critical role in determining the priorities of
national actors just as it does in liberalism.
The most striking aspect of the history of drug policy and the
intellectual property regime generally is the extent to which the nature of
the original agreement was dominated by the interests of the United States,
and to a somewhat lesser extent those of the EU. Indeed, it is difficult to
see how they could have done much better. True, there were two
provisions for dealing with emergencies and promises of progress in the
area of agricultural policy, but the practical effect of the safeguard
provisions on the profitability connected with the property rights that were
granted has been modest and the liberalization of agricultural policy has yet
to be realized. It seems relatively clear that the reason that the intellectual
property rules of the WTO are so one-sided is because at the time they were
negotiated, the United States-and only the U.S.-was able to credibly
threaten to exit the regime and negotiate separate trade agreements
bilaterally. The fact that it had already embarked on a program of
unilateralism in connection with Section 301 had convinced other states that
it was serious about its threats. Also, given the mismatch in economic
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power between the U.S. and the vast majority of other states, bilateral
negotiations represented a grim prospect that other states wanted very much
to avoid.
Of course, once the intellectual property rules were made and progress
had also been achieved in the area of reducing non-tariff barriers, the U.S.
had a far greater investment in the success of the WTO than it had had
previously. Its bargaining power was reduced somewhat, and arguably, it
could now no longer threaten to credibly exit the trade regime because the
opportunity costs of doing so had grown enormously. Quite the contrary, it
now had to worry about maintaining the integrity of the intellectual
property regime in the face of what over time were sure to be challenges
from states capable of producing and marketing generic versions of its
firm's most popular and profitable drugs.
The politics of the intellectual property regime in the area of drugs has
continued to evolve. The continued economic development of states such
as China, Brazil, and India, with their increasingly large numbers of middle
class consumers, now creates the backdrop against which the
democratization of the WTO, and other international institutions willing to
engage in redistribution, is taking place. What is less clear is the extent to
which this is likely to lead to more democratic policymaking in the WTO
generally, and a drug regime that provides more distributive benefits for
developing states.
To date there has been some modest progress and it has tended to
involve either one of the largest of the most advanced developing
economies, or a coalition of developing states. This is true both in the
AIDS and Glivek cases. Recall that in the case of AIDS drugs, both Brazil
and a consortium of ten other middle income Latin American states
including Argentina, Mexico, and Chile rejected the prices offered by U.S.
and European drug firms. Instead, they negotiated a deal with Abbot labs
that was half the cost negotiated a year earlier by a group of Caribbean
states, and which was comparable to what was being offered at the time to
African countries. Considering that the Latin American market was
prospectively far more lucrative that the African or Caribbean markets
because the ability of consumers in Latin America to pay was much higher,
this was a remarkable outcome.
In the case of Glivek the outcome was more complicated but not
dissimilar. South Korea attempted to negotiate a price that was
significantly lower than the drug company wanted to charge, but soon
found itself being pressured by the U.S. government to agree to a price that
was equal to the average price that was being charged to consumers in
Group Seven countries. The United States also urged South Korea to reject
a license that would have allowed a generic South Korean firm to produce
its own version of the drug at a lower cost. The Brazilian government had
considerably better luck. When it threatened to issue a compulsory license,
the price of the drug was quickly dropped to $13 dollars per dose, six
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dollars less than what South Korean consumers found themselves having to
pay.
Large, middle income developing countries and to a growing role for
coalitions get a better deal than poorer countries because they have the
power to produce generic versions of U.S. drugs anytime they desire, and
they either contain or potentially contain lucrative middle class markets that
U.S. firms can't afford to lose or alienate. South Korea probably possesses
far more capacity to produce its own generic drugs than does Brazil, but
Brazil possesses more middle class consumers for U.S. products than
Korea, and it is less dependent on the U.S. for its security and for a market
for its own exported products.
This trend of an increasing empowerment of large middle income
states shows every sign of accelerating in the future as the wealth and
middle classes of states like China, Russia, India, and Brazil continue to
grow. There is every reason to believe that they will continue to press for
lower drug prices when there is a public health emergency and shorter
patent periods of patent protection for their generic drug firms. States such
as India, that will soon have to face the prospect of watching its generic
firms destroyed as its period of negotiated grace comes to an end, can be
expected to launch an aggressive campaign to either extend the grace period
further or secure a permanent change in the rules.
It would, however, be a mistake to overestimate the bargaining power
that these large, middle income developing states possess, or the likelihood
that they will be willing to invest it in a vigorous campaign to alter the
character of the WTO's drug regime. While their economies are large
compared to those of other developing states, they are many times smaller
than that of the U.S. or EU and their economies continue to be more
dependent on the developed states than the developed states are dependent
on them. Moreover, except during the wake of an extraordinary crisis such
as the AIDS epidemic which affects a significant portion of the population
and has extremely high political visibility, these states each have a host of
economic concerns that have a far greater political priority than reducing
the cost of cutting edge drugs that often affect only a tiny proportion of
citizens. Most of these states have no significant drug industry. Even
India, the developing state that stands the most to gain from a loosening of
the intellectual property rules connected with drugs, is unlikely to
jeopardize the enormous gains that it has made with U.S. firms in other
areas by adopting an overly confrontational stance in connection with
drugs.
In such an environment where individual developing states have
neither the power nor the interest necessary to mount a long term campaign
to reform the drug regime, it would seem to make sense for them to pursue
their collective interest by creating a coalition. We have seen that this has
been done on a number of occasions, but the significance and effectiveness
of this trend toward coalition building is also unclear. It is true that one of a
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consortium of ten Latin American countries managed to obtain a concession
on the price of AIDS drugs, but that price does not appear to be lower than
that obtained by the largest and most economically power state in the region
acting alone. The Caribbean and African countries that formed coalitions
seem to have been somewhat less successful.
There is also the concern that up to this point the coalitions have been
ad hoc and oriented toward the goal of obtaining lower prices in connection
with a specific drug. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the initial
focus of these coalitions has been narrow; the initial focus of what was to
become the European Community was also narrow. But the lack of
permanency is concerning because it suggests that the states involved are
more concerned with short term problem solving than they are in creating
some entity that could pursue their collective long term interest in altering
the fundamental character of the drug regime.
In sum, these cases give us good reason to expect that the formation of
coalitions of states for the purpose of bargaining will become increasingly
common, but less reason to believe that they will be strikingly successful in
reforming the regime. The differences in the success that was achieved by
the Latin American coalition, which was led by Argentina, Mexico, and
Chile, compared to that led by the African and Caribbean states certainly
suggests that the success of a coalition depends critically on the
membership and leadership of one or more of the larger and economically
advanced developing states. However, in none of the cases has a coalition
established the institutional roots necessary to counterbalance the role of
those developed state interests that support the status quo.
V. Developed State Strategies for Slowing Distributive Progress
While developing state progress toward achieving a more equitable
drug regime has so far been modest, the impressive rates of economic
growth currently being achieved by states such as China, Russia, and India
would seem to argue for the eventual evolution of a system that is much
less dominated by the interests of the U.S. and EU. However, to embrace
this conclusion too quickly is to ignore the fact that the most economically
powerful northern states have developed and refined any number of
institutional strategies to "lock in" the advantages that they currently enjoy.
The nature and composition of the UN Security Council, which has
perpetuated a post-war distribution of power for over fifty years, is only one
particularly prominent example of such a strategy. There are many others.
The phenomenon of "bargaining on price" that has played such a
central role in the discussion up to this point is a good example of one of
the more subtle strategies employed, and one which has received little or no
attention in the literature of intellectual property generally. At first glance
it appears to be a developing state strategy that is designed to chip away at
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the foundations of the drug regime. Some might even argue that it provides
the most tangible evidence available that the regime is evolving in response
to changes in the relative economic power of the more advanced developing
countries.
Unfortunately, there is good reason to believe that this perspective is
overly optimistic. What bargaining on price actually does is allow the U.S.
and EU to exchange a one time price break for preserving the integrity of
the regime as a whole. No rule is renegotiated, no new precedent is
established that will operate, however subtly, to redefine the regime or
jeopardize the institutionalization of the principles it contains. As a result,
it seems more appropriate to view a price break as an isolated victory that is
materially important in the short term, but institutionally irrelevant in the
long term. Like a political pressure valve installed by the developed states
to protect their interests, a price reduction releases pent up pressure for
reform while insuring that the underlying system is never placed in
jeopardy.
Bargaining on price thus provides an effective strategy for the U.S.
and EU to deal with the growing power of the large, economically
advanced developing states while they further institutionalize the regime.
Developing states do benefit, of course. Patients receive a given drug more
cheaply than they otherwise would, and some patients who would not have
access to the drug at all are able to obtain it. Politicians in developing states
are able to reap the domestic political benefits of being able to claim that
they have secured far lower prices for their country than those that are
available to citizens of neighboring countries.6' But the developed states
have achieved the larger victory of deflecting growing political pressure for
reform while maintaining an extremely profitable regime.62
Over time the largest and most scientifically advanced of the
developed states such as India, Russia, and China may decide that price
breaks are not enough, or the U.S. and EU may decide to reduce prices
either because they feel that they are costing too much or because there is
growing pressure from developing states for price parity. Should this
occur, the U.S. and EU will almost certainly resort to other regime
preserving strategies.
One such strategy involves the use of a bilateral linkage strategy where
the developed state signs a second treaty in which it agrees to provide the
61 Of course, this will do little to lower the prices for the citizens of developing states
generally, but it will take an exceptional leader to pass up the short term political benefits in
his home country to pursue a policy that primarily will benefit the citizens of poorer states
and will involve the political risks associated with confronting an economic superpower.
62 Negotiating prices separately for each drug might seem to involve too many transaction
costs for both large developing states and the drug companies, but over time these will be
reduced through the use of the same standard operating procedures that are now applied to
states with different national health systems.
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developing state with improved access to its markets via a Free Trade
Agreement, or an increased military assistance in exchange for the
developing state agreeing not to seek to renegotiate certain provisions of the
intellectual property regime, or to recommit itself to maintaining the highest
standards of intellectual property protection within its borders.63  This
strategy enables the U.S. or EU to incrementally and unobtrusively gain a
commitment on the part of the developing state to ratchet upward its
intellectual property standards beyond those currently embodied in TRIPS
at the modest cost of providing the developing state with a benefit that it is
likely to want to provide in the future anyway.
For their part the politicians of the developing state obtain the
substantial political benefit of being able to say that they have achieved a
degree of access to U.S. or EU markets that the rest of the developing states
have not been able to collectively achieve to date at Doha. The fact that the
monetary value of this increased access to the citizens of the developing
state will fall over time as the developed states sign comparable agreements
with other developing states, and that the costs associated with extending
intellectual property are likely to rise sharply tends to be ignored in favor of
the short term political victory.
Alternatively, the U.S./EU could attempt to win a developing state's
support of the intellectual property regime by giving it a direct stake in the
regime's success. This could be done through the device of purchasing
generic drug companies in the developing state and continuing to operate
them there, or by outsourcing the manufacture of drugs under U.S./EU
patents to generic firms in the developing states. This is not a strategy that
can be employed too widely because it is predicated on the expectation that
the foreign firms that are owned or contracted with are large enough and
powerful enough to be a significant political force in the politics of the
developing state. This condition is unlikely to be met in more than a
handful of economically advanced developing states, but it is important to
note that these states are also the ones most likely to be the most vocal and
politically powerful.
These same strategies can just as easily be employed to "break" a
coalition of developing states as deal with one or more of the most
economically powerful developing states because the task is basically the
same. This would not be the case if all developing states were the same
size and there was a large coalition that the U.S./EU had to bargain with.
Simply inducing one or two of the twenty-five or thirty states in the
coalition would have little effect, and the U.S./EU would face the prospect
63 This strategy is closely related to the "regime shifting" and "regime blocking" strategies
discussed by Braithwaite and Drahos. See PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 85-107 (2003). In this
case, the developed state has shifted from the venue of intellectual property and trade talks in
the WTO to a bilateral negotiation.
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of either having to dilute the current regime in significant ways or of having
to pay a heavy price to maintain it.
Unfortunately for the developing states, they are an extremely
heterogeneous group whose ability to bargain effectively with the
developed states appears to be dependent on the leadership of a small subset
of states that are large and more economically developed than the rest. This
fact operates to reduce the task of the U.S. and EU in dealing with
coalitions to the near-equivalent of what has just been described. The
existence of the coalition is likely to somewhat increase the cost of reaching
an agreement with one or more large developing states that are leading the
coalition, and it could conceivably delay the reaching on an agreement for
sometime if the large state places a high value of being the leader of the
developing world. However, there is no evidence to date that suggests that
U.S./EU strategies such as bargaining on price and bilateral bargaining will
be ineffective against coalitions. It is worth noting that in the case of AIDS
drugs, the Argentina led coalition of ten Latin American states does not
appear to have wrested a better deal from the drug companies than Brazil
was able to procure by acting alone. Even more significantly, there appears
to be little evidence that any developing state coalition is even actively
pursuing a reform goal that is more ambitious than a one time price
reduction.
VI Conclusion
With its coercive origins and its distributionally perverse effects, the
TRIPS regime constitutes one of the most salient manifestations of the
democratic deficit in the WTO. As such, the political history of TRIPS
provides a good opportunity to examine the kinds of challenges that will
have to be overcome if the developing world's expectations for more
democratic policy making and greater redistribution are going to be met in
the future. In this paper we have focused on the drug regime. The drug
regime is particularly interesting from a political standpoint because its
benefits are not only redistributed upward like the rest of TRIPS, but they
are also arguably inefficient and threaten to undermine human rights in the
area of public health.
Given the role that economic coercion, in the form of institutional
brinksmanship, played in the origin of the regime and arguably continues to
play, we began by looking at the prospect that such coercion is likely to be
contained via international legal institutions in the near future. We argued
that contemporary international law has made little attempt to do this
despite arguments from both the north and the south that some limits on
economic power are needed and appropriate. Although international
tribunals, in particular the Appellate Body of the WTO, have evidenced an
appetite for increasing their lawmaking function to level the international
economic playing field, their ability to make any real progress in doing so
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has been constrained by the fear of willful and visible noncompliance of the
United States and the European Union which could greatly damage their
prestige and influence.
We argued that the existence of this constraint testifies to the
importance of achieving a better balance in the bargaining power within
developed states and between the developed states and the large middle
income developing states such as China, Brazil, and India, which have both
more acute public health demands than do developed states and the
potential capacity to produce generic versions of virtually any drug should
they decide to do so. Unfortunately, while such an improved balance in
bargaining power is a necessary precondition for distributive progress, it is
far from being a sufficient one especially in the short term. The problem is
the potential for institutional "lock-in," or the creation of institutional rules
to perpetuate a particular distribution of bargaining power long after it has
eroded.
Recognizing the gradual emergence of the large developing states and
inferring its possible long term consequences in renegotiating the current
regime, the large developed states together with their drug firms have taken
a number of steps to institutionally lock in the present regime so that it will
be difficult to reform. One particularly effective strategy for doing this is to
respond to developing state discontent by bargaining on the price of
individual drugs in order to allay discontent before it reaches the point
where states begin to push for more fundamental (and distributionally
democratic) reforms that would threaten the underpinnings of the regime.
As a consequence, while the price reductions that have been achieved in
connection with AIDS drugs and Glivec have been important in human
terms, their institutional impact in terms of insuring that the TRIPS's drug
regime will be more responsive to southern interests in the future have been
negligible.
Bargaining on price is only one of the strategies that the developed
states and their drug companies appear to be employing to perpetuate the
status quo. Developed states can approach developing states bilaterally and
offer to negotiate free trade agreements in exchange for a commitment on
the part of the developing state to maintain the highest standards of
intellectual property protection. Alternatively, developed state drug
companies can purchase generic drug firms or otherwise outsource the
production of drugs to developing states in order to give the largest and
most economically powerful developing states a modest stake in
maintaining the current regime. Neither strategy offers much real value to
the populations of the developing states in the long run, but they do
improve the political prospects of the politicians in power in the short run,
and this makes them extremely effective. This effectiveness makes them a
particularly useful tool for developed states to use when attempting to
prevent coalitions of developing states from forming, or in dividing those
that have formed.
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Does this mean that there is little or no prospect of reforming the drug
regime? For those interested in distributive justice, the democratic deficit,
public health, and legitimacy of what is one of the world's most prominent
international institutions in the developing world-this would be a very dim
prospect. There are, however, reasons to be at least moderately hopeful. A
major source for hope lies in the drug regime collapsing due to political
over-reach on the part of EU and U.S. drug company executives. If history
is any guide, their own preoccupation with their short term interests will
eventually lead them to overplay their hand and destroy the regime that they
have so tirelessly engineered. 64
There are some scattered signs that this is already starting to happen.
For example, the seemingly endless push within the United States to patent
not only end products such as drugs, but myriad processes, chemical
compounds, and every piece of genetic material as it is identified threatens
to raise the "overhead" associated with innovation to the point where it
threatens the productivity and profitability of broad segments of U.S.
industry.65 Almost inevitably, it will pit the interests of large U.S. research
universities against the drug industry in a battle that could easily leave the
drug industry losing control of the drug patent process and dramatically
increasing its own overhead costs. If either occurs, the international
community and developing states could be the beneficiary of revised rules.
Another source for hope lies with the continued development of the
large middle income states. Even if the U.S. and EU succeed in delaying
reform for a number of years, it seems likely that a small coalition of the
most technologically-oriented states with the largest consumer markets will
eventually find themselves in a position to demand a renegotiation of some
of the regimes most regressive components such as the twenty year life on
patents. The upcoming expiration of the grace period for generic firms in
India should provide one indication of the pace with which things are
changing. While the drug firms will be anxious to hold firm to the current
deadlines in order to eliminate an important thorn in their side, the growing
64 Political blunders are common in industries that have invested heavily in securing
political influence. According to a recent article in the New York Times, Abbott
Laboratories decided to quintuple the price of the annual dosage costs of its important AIDS
drug Norvir from $1500 to $7800. The fact that Norvir was developed with federal money
during the 1990's (which has earned Abbott more than one billion dollars already), coupled
with the fact that the price increase will result in thousands of Americans paying ten times
the price Europeans pay, quickly made the case a focal point for AIDS and consumer
activists and the focus of a federal hearing. Gardiner Harris, Price of AIDS Drugs Intensifies
Debate on Legal Imports, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 2004, at Al.
65 See Keith E. Maskus & J. H. Reichman, Mini-Symposium: International Public Goods
and the Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (paper
given at the Conference on International Public Goods and the Transfer of Technology under
a Globilized Intellectual Property Regime, Duke University School of Law, Durham, N.C.)
(Apr. 24-26, 2003).
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economic and political importance of India could well lead the U.S.
government to agree to an extension of the grace period. Should it do so, it
could well be the harbinger of even more significant compromises in the
future.

